The UConn VoTeR Center performed a partial post-election audit of the memory cards for the AccuVote Optical Scan tabulators that were to be used in the November 2007 Connecticut Elections. The cards were programmed by LHS Associates of Methuen, Massachusetts, and shipped to the towns in Connecticut. The research and development required to perform the audit and the methodology and procedures used to conduct the audit are essentially identical to what was used to perform the pre-election memory card audit, and we refer the reader to our earlier report to avoid a complete restatement.
In this partial memory cards audit, the total of 100 cards were received and tested by the VoTeR Center. This represents the total number of cards made available (the cards were not selected randomly), and covers over 5% of the cards actually used in the election. Among these, 8% of the cards (8 cards) contained “junk data”, that is, they were unreadable, which is easily detected by the tabulators, and such cards could not have been used in the election. One card (1.1%) was not programmed for elections. Among the usable cards, about 40% of the cards (36 cards) were used in the election according to the card status. About 47% of the cards were set for election, but not used in the election (these are most likely the cards from the second machine in each district and the “back up” cards). One card was found in the state set for election but with non-zero counters, indicating that the district tested the card in election mode and did not reset the card. This is a detectable situation, since proper procedures require that the “zero counter” report is produced at the start of the election. All of the above (usable) cards contained valid ballot data and the executable code on these cards was the expected code, with no extraneous data or code on the cards.
The audit was performed on request of the Oﬃce of the Secretary of the State.
Full report: audit07mc-post