Statistical Analysis of the Post-Election Audit Data 2011 September Primary Election

The University of Connecticut Center for Voting Technology Research (VoTeR Center) received the data gathered in the post-election audit performed in the State of Connecticut following the September 2011 election. The audits involved the randomly selected 10% of the districts and the audit returns were conveyed by the Office of the Secretary of the State (SOTS) to the VoTeR Center on November 18th of 2011. The audit data received by the VoTeR Center contains 83 records, where each record represents information about a given candidate: date, district, machine seal number, office, candidate, machine counted total, hand counted total of the votes considered unquestionable by the auditors, hand counted total of the votes considered questionable by the auditors, and the hand counted total, that is, the sum of undisputed and questionable ballots. This report contains several statistical analyses of the audit returns.

This report presents the analysis of 83 records. The data presented in this analysis show that the absolute average reported discrepancy is lower than the number of questionable ballots (0.04 versus 0.93).
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Technological Audits of Optical Scan Voting Systems: Summary for 2007 to 2010 Connecticut Elections

Security and integrity concerns regarding the use of electronic voting technologies in elections necessitate comprehensive election audits. Two types of audits are routinely performed in all state-wide elections in Connecticut: random post-election hand-counted audits and technological audits. This report presents the summary of the technological audit results in Connecticut from 2007 to 2010. The technological audits were designed on the request of the Secretary of the State (SOTS) of Connecticut by VoTeR Center and are conducted by the Center before (pre-election) and after (post-election) each state-wide election and selected primaries. The technological audits focus on the information contained on the memory cards used with the AccuVote Optical Scan (AV-OS) tabulators. This report presents the cumulative results of the pre-election and post-election technological audits. The audits examine the correctness of the programming of the memory cards with respect to the specific elections and the usage patterns at the districts in light of the election procedures established by the SOTS Office. The audits also assess the reliability of the memory cards. The conclusions are that districts do not always adhere to the established pre-election procedures. Most notably, in recent elections over 6% of the memory cards are duplicated by the districts, a practice that is not permitted by the SOTS Office; additionally, the number of cards submitted for audits has been substantially lower since 2008. The audits also established that more than 10% of the memory cards may experience data loss between the time they are programmed and the day of the election; this is apparently the reason for card duplication done by the districts. This data loss is most likely caused by the weak batteries on the cards (however, as of this writing it is not clear how long a fresh battery lasts in a memory card as some cards are known to consume substantially more power than others). To provide a better statistical basis for the overall elections landscape in Connecticut, it is recommended that the number of cards examined by the audits is substantially increased.
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Statistical Analysis of the Post-Election Audit Data 2010 November Election

The University of Connecticut Center for Voting Technology Research (VoTeR Center) received the data gathered in the post-election audit performed in the State of Connecticut following the November 2010 election. The audits involved the randomly selected 10% of the districts and the audit returns were conveyed by the Office of the Secretary of the State (SOTS) to the VoTeR Center on December 22^nd of 2010. The audit data received by the VoTeR Center contains 867 records, where each record represents information about a given candidate: date, district, machine seal number, office, candidate, machine counted total, hand counted total of the votes considered unquestionable by the auditors, hand counted total of the votes considered questionable by the auditors, and the hand counted total, that is, the sum of undisputed and questionable ballots. This report contains several statistical analyses of the audit returns and recommendations. The statistical analysis in this report deals with the 847 records that are sufficiently complete to perform the analysis.

The VoTeR Center’s initial review of audit reports prepared by the towns revealed a number of returns with unexplained differences between hand and machine counts. The vast majority of records with high discrepancies were concentrated in the following three districts: East Haven (Deer Run School) with the highest reported discrepancy of 180, Hartford (Burns School) with the highest reported discrepancy of 170, and Preston (Town Hall) with the highest reported discrepancy of 55. Additionally, one or more discrepancies were reported in all but one district for the town of Orange; here the highest reported discrepancy was 14, however this could not be explained as no questionable ballots were reported. Following this initial review the SOTS Office performed additional information gathering and investigation and, in some cases, conducted independent hand-counting of ballots in the four districts mentioned above. The final information was conveyed to the VoTeR Center on June 17^th of 2011 for the 48 records pertaining to those districts. The rest of the records (799 out of 847) discussed in this audit report are the original records reported by the towns.
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VoTeR Center and SOTS Win 2010 EAC Grant

The VoTeR Center and the Office of the Secretary of the State (SOTS) of Connecticut have jointly applied for and won the 2010 Voting System Pre-Election Logic and Accuracy Testing & Post-Election Audit Initiative grant announced by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC).

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VoTeR Center wins Provost’s Awards for Excellence in Public Engagement

The VoTeR Center received the 2010 Provost’s Awards for Excellence in Public Engagement in the program category.

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Statistical Analysis of the Post-Election Audit Data 2010 August Primary Election

The University of Connecticut Center for Voting Technology Research (VoTeR Center) received the data gathered in the post-election audit performed in the State of Connecticut following the August 2010 primary election. The audits involved the randomly selected 10% of the districts and the audit returns were conveyed by the Office of the Secretary of the State (SOTS) to the VoTeR Center from September 21^st (almost all returns) to October 26^th of 2010. The audit data received by the VoTeR Center contains 465 records, where each record represents information about a given candidate: date, district, machine seal number, office, candidate, machine counted total, hand counted total of the votes considered unquestionable by the auditors, hand counted total of the votes considered questionable by the auditors, and the hand counted total, that is, the sum of undisputed and questionable ballots.

The review of the audit reports prepared by the towns did not reveal any returns with high unexplained differences between hand and machine counts. The largest discrepancy is a single case of 6 votes (4.5%), the second largest is a single case of 4 votes (0.99%). The rest show discrepancies of one or less, with 95.7% of the returns showing no discrepancies. There are in total twenty records with discrepancies. We note that in seven cases out of twenty the auditors provided an explanation for the observed discrepancies. Majority of the explicated cases refer to the improper markings of the ballots by voters. One of the examples of such an improper marking is having ‘X’ mark in the bubble instead of filling in the bubble. The optical scan machine used in Connecticut, the AccuVote optical scanner, is able to recognize partially marked bubbles in some cases, but this depends on the bubble fill pattern.
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Pre-Election Audit of Memory Cards for the August 10, 2010 Primary Elections

The University of Connecticut Center for Voting Technology Research (VoTeR Center) performed a pre-election audit of the memory cards for the Accu-Vote Optical Scan tabulators that were to be used in the August 10, 2010 elections. The cards were programmed by LHS Associates of Methuen, Massachusetts, and shipped to Connecticut districts for use in the elections. The VoTeR Center received in total 226 memory cards from 218 districts for this audit. The cards were received during the period from August 6, 2010 to August 17, 2010. This document reports on the findings obtained during the audit.

Among these 226 cards, 192 (85%) were correctly programmed for elections. These cards contained valid ballot data and the executable code on these cards was the expected code, with no extraneous data or code on the cards. Concerning the remaining cards, 34 (15% of the total number of cards) were found to be unusable by the AV-OS. In particular, these cards contained ‘junk’ (i.e., apparently random) data. These cards were unreadable, according to the tabulators and could not have been used in an election. (We report on the causes of such card failures separately – See here.)
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Determining the Causes of AccuVote Optical Scan Voting Terminal Memory Card Failures

Optical scan (OS) voting systems play an increasing role in the United States elections, with over 40 states deploying such systems. The AccuVote optical scanners (AV-OS) manufactured by ES&S account for over 20% of all OS systems. OS systems typically use removable media (cards) to provide election-specific programming to the scanners and to convey precinct election results for central tabulation. Several reports document occurrences of AV-OS memory card failures, with up to 15% of all cards failing in some cases.

This paper reports on determining the causes of memory card failures that lead to complete loss of data from the card. An initial experimental analysis identified the battery discharge as a significant part of the problem. This finding led to the question of the dependability of the builtin function of the AccuVote OS system that issues a warning when the memory card contains a low-voltage battery. We identified the components used to implement this function in one type of AccuVote memory card. Using the specifications of the commodity batteries that are used in these cards, we determined the time interval from the instant when a battery warning is issued by the AccuVote to the point when the battery does not have enough voltage to retain data on the memory card. We show that such interval is about 2 weeks. Thus timely warnings cannot be provided to protect against battery discharge and loss of data during the election process. The factors contributing to the short warning interval are likely to apply to other battery-backed RAM cards, such as those used in the ES&S Model 100. Recommendations for mitigating the problem are made in light of the expected behavior of the warning system.

Research funded by the Secretary of the State of Connecticut and performed at the Center for Voting Technology Research at the University of Connecticut.

Full Paper: evt2010

Statistical Analysis of the Post Election Audit Data 2009 November Elections

The University of Connecticut Center for Voting Technology Research (VoTeR) received the data gathered in the post-election audit in the State of Connecticut following the November 2009 election. The audits involved the randomly selected 10% of the districts and the audit returns were conveyed by the Office of the Secretary of the State (SOTS) to the Center on December 8^th and 18^th of 2009. The original audit data contained 776 records, where each record represents information about a given candidate: date, district, machine seal number, office, candidate, machine counted total, hand counted total of the votes considered unquestionable by the auditors, hand counted total of the votes considered questionable by the auditors, and the hand counted total, that is, the sum of undisputed and questionable ballots.
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Post-Election Audit of Memory Cards for the November 2009 Elections

The Voting Technology Research (VoTeR) Center at the University of Connecticut performed a post-election audit of the memory cards for the Accu-Vote Optical Scan tabulators that were used in the November 2009 elections. The cards were programmed by LHS Associates of Methuen, Massachusetts, and shipped to Connecticut districts for use in the elections. The VoTeR Center received in total 120 memory cards from 49 districts after the elections. The cards were received during the period from December 12, 2009 to February 12, 2010. Among the received cards, 49 were used in the elections, the rest remained unused (either being unusable or serving as back-up cards). This document reports on the findings obtained during the audit.

Among the 49 cards actually used in the elections all were properly programmed, however 2 cards were involved in duplication and one card was a non-standard (32K) card. These cards contained valid ballot data and the executable code on these cards was the expected code, with no extraneous data or code on the cards. Concerning the remaining cards, 14 (12% of the total number of cards) were found to contain junk data, that is, they were unreadable, which is easily detected by the tabulators; had a card contained junk data at the time of the election, it could not have been used. A separate report will document our findings regarding the reasons causing occurrences of such cards.
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