Statistical Analysis of the Post-Election Audit Data 2011 September Primary Election

The University of Connecticut Center for Voting Technology Research (VoTeR Center) received the data gathered in the post-election audit performed in the State of Connecticut following the September 2011 election. The audits involved the randomly selected 10% of the districts and the audit returns were conveyed by the Office of the Secretary of the State (SOTS) to the VoTeR Center on November 18th of 2011. The audit data received by the VoTeR Center contains 83 records, where each record represents information about a given candidate: date, district, machine seal number, office, candidate, machine counted total, hand counted total of the votes considered unquestionable by the auditors, hand counted total of the votes considered questionable by the auditors, and the hand counted total, that is, the sum of undisputed and questionable ballots. This report contains several statistical analyses of the audit returns.

This report presents the analysis of 83 records. The data presented in this analysis show that the absolute average reported discrepancy is lower than the number of questionable ballots (0.04 versus 0.93).
Read the rest of this entry »

Statistical Analysis of the Post-Election Audit Data 2010 November Election

The University of Connecticut Center for Voting Technology Research (VoTeR Center) received the data gathered in the post-election audit performed in the State of Connecticut following the November 2010 election. The audits involved the randomly selected 10% of the districts and the audit returns were conveyed by the Office of the Secretary of the State (SOTS) to the VoTeR Center on December 22^nd of 2010. The audit data received by the VoTeR Center contains 867 records, where each record represents information about a given candidate: date, district, machine seal number, office, candidate, machine counted total, hand counted total of the votes considered unquestionable by the auditors, hand counted total of the votes considered questionable by the auditors, and the hand counted total, that is, the sum of undisputed and questionable ballots. This report contains several statistical analyses of the audit returns and recommendations. The statistical analysis in this report deals with the 847 records that are sufficiently complete to perform the analysis.

The VoTeR Center’s initial review of audit reports prepared by the towns revealed a number of returns with unexplained differences between hand and machine counts. The vast majority of records with high discrepancies were concentrated in the following three districts: East Haven (Deer Run School) with the highest reported discrepancy of 180, Hartford (Burns School) with the highest reported discrepancy of 170, and Preston (Town Hall) with the highest reported discrepancy of 55. Additionally, one or more discrepancies were reported in all but one district for the town of Orange; here the highest reported discrepancy was 14, however this could not be explained as no questionable ballots were reported. Following this initial review the SOTS Office performed additional information gathering and investigation and, in some cases, conducted independent hand-counting of ballots in the four districts mentioned above. The final information was conveyed to the VoTeR Center on June 17^th of 2011 for the 48 records pertaining to those districts. The rest of the records (799 out of 847) discussed in this audit report are the original records reported by the towns.
Read the rest of this entry »

Statistical Analysis of the Post-Election Audit Data 2010 August Primary Election

The University of Connecticut Center for Voting Technology Research (VoTeR Center) received the data gathered in the post-election audit performed in the State of Connecticut following the August 2010 primary election. The audits involved the randomly selected 10% of the districts and the audit returns were conveyed by the Office of the Secretary of the State (SOTS) to the VoTeR Center from September 21^st (almost all returns) to October 26^th of 2010. The audit data received by the VoTeR Center contains 465 records, where each record represents information about a given candidate: date, district, machine seal number, office, candidate, machine counted total, hand counted total of the votes considered unquestionable by the auditors, hand counted total of the votes considered questionable by the auditors, and the hand counted total, that is, the sum of undisputed and questionable ballots.

The review of the audit reports prepared by the towns did not reveal any returns with high unexplained differences between hand and machine counts. The largest discrepancy is a single case of 6 votes (4.5%), the second largest is a single case of 4 votes (0.99%). The rest show discrepancies of one or less, with 95.7% of the returns showing no discrepancies. There are in total twenty records with discrepancies. We note that in seven cases out of twenty the auditors provided an explanation for the observed discrepancies. Majority of the explicated cases refer to the improper markings of the ballots by voters. One of the examples of such an improper marking is having ‘X’ mark in the bubble instead of filling in the bubble. The optical scan machine used in Connecticut, the AccuVote optical scanner, is able to recognize partially marked bubbles in some cases, but this depends on the bubble fill pattern.
Read the rest of this entry »

Pre-Election Audit of Memory Cards for the August 10, 2010 Primary Elections

The University of Connecticut Center for Voting Technology Research (VoTeR Center) performed a pre-election audit of the memory cards for the Accu-Vote Optical Scan tabulators that were to be used in the August 10, 2010 elections. The cards were programmed by LHS Associates of Methuen, Massachusetts, and shipped to Connecticut districts for use in the elections. The VoTeR Center received in total 226 memory cards from 218 districts for this audit. The cards were received during the period from August 6, 2010 to August 17, 2010. This document reports on the findings obtained during the audit.

Among these 226 cards, 192 (85%) were correctly programmed for elections. These cards contained valid ballot data and the executable code on these cards was the expected code, with no extraneous data or code on the cards. Concerning the remaining cards, 34 (15% of the total number of cards) were found to be unusable by the AV-OS. In particular, these cards contained ‘junk’ (i.e., apparently random) data. These cards were unreadable, according to the tabulators and could not have been used in an election. (We report on the causes of such card failures separately – See here.)
Read the rest of this entry »

Statistical Analysis of the Post Election Audit Data 2009 November Elections

The University of Connecticut Center for Voting Technology Research (VoTeR) received the data gathered in the post-election audit in the State of Connecticut following the November 2009 election. The audits involved the randomly selected 10% of the districts and the audit returns were conveyed by the Office of the Secretary of the State (SOTS) to the Center on December 8^th and 18^th of 2009. The original audit data contained 776 records, where each record represents information about a given candidate: date, district, machine seal number, office, candidate, machine counted total, hand counted total of the votes considered unquestionable by the auditors, hand counted total of the votes considered questionable by the auditors, and the hand counted total, that is, the sum of undisputed and questionable ballots.
Read the rest of this entry »

Post-Election Audit of Memory Cards for the November 2009 Elections

The Voting Technology Research (VoTeR) Center at the University of Connecticut performed a post-election audit of the memory cards for the Accu-Vote Optical Scan tabulators that were used in the November 2009 elections. The cards were programmed by LHS Associates of Methuen, Massachusetts, and shipped to Connecticut districts for use in the elections. The VoTeR Center received in total 120 memory cards from 49 districts after the elections. The cards were received during the period from December 12, 2009 to February 12, 2010. Among the received cards, 49 were used in the elections, the rest remained unused (either being unusable or serving as back-up cards). This document reports on the findings obtained during the audit.

Among the 49 cards actually used in the elections all were properly programmed, however 2 cards were involved in duplication and one card was a non-standard (32K) card. These cards contained valid ballot data and the executable code on these cards was the expected code, with no extraneous data or code on the cards. Concerning the remaining cards, 14 (12% of the total number of cards) were found to contain junk data, that is, they were unreadable, which is easily detected by the tabulators; had a card contained junk data at the time of the election, it could not have been used. A separate report will document our findings regarding the reasons causing occurrences of such cards.
Read the rest of this entry »

Pre-Election Audit of Memory Cards for the November 2009 Elections

The Voting Technology Research (VoTeR) Center at the University of Connecticut performed a pre-election audit of the memory cards for the Accu-Vote Optical Scan tabulators that were to be used in the November 2009 Elections. The cards were programmed by LHS Associates of Methuen, Massachusetts, and shipped to Connecticut districts for use in the elections. The VoTeR Center received in total 491 memory cards from 481 districts before the elections. This document reports on the findings obtained during the audit. The 491 cards represent over 80.6% of all districts, thus the audit is broad enough to draw meaningful conclusions.

Among the 491 cards representing those intended for use in the elections, 87% were properly programmed. These cards contained valid ballot data and the executable code on these cards was the expected code, with no extraneous data or code on the cards. Concerning the remaining cards, 42 or 9% were found to contain “junk” data, that is, they were unreadable, which is easily detected by the tabulators; had a card contained junk data at the time of the election, it could not have been used. It was determined that weak batteries is the primary cause of this and a separate report will document our findings.
Read the rest of this entry »

Statistical Analysis of the Post Election Audit Data 2008 November Elections

The University of Connecticut Voting Technology Research (VoTeR) Center received the data gathered in the post-election audit performed in the State of Connecticut following the November 2008 election. The audits involved the randomly selected 10% of the districts and the audit returns were conveyed by the Office of the Secretary of the State (SOTS) to the VoTeR Center on December 3^rd, 4^th and 18^th of 2008. The original audit data contained 1311 records, where each record represents information about a given candidate: date, district, machine seal number, office, candidate, machine counted total, hand counted total of the votes considered unquestionable by the auditors, hand counted total of the votes considered questionable by the auditors, and the hand counted total, that is, the sum of undisputed and questionable ballots.
Read the rest of this entry »

Post-Election Audit of Memory Cards for the November 2008 Presidential Elections

The UConn VoTeR Center performed a post-election audit of the memory cards for the Accu-Vote Optical Scan tabulators that were used and to be used in the November 2008 Elections. The cards were programmed by LHS Associates of Methuen, Massachusetts, and shipped to Connecticut districts for use in the elections. The VoTeR Center received in total 462 memory cards from a number of districts after the elections. This document reports on the findings obtained during the audit. Among these cards, 279 were used in the elections, the rest remained unused, serving as back-up cards. The 279 cards represent over 30% of all districts, thus the audit is broad enough to draw meaningful conclusions. We note that in a few cases, districts apparently had problems with one tabulator and had to complete the election using another tabulator.
Read the rest of this entry »

Pre-Election Audit of Memory Cards for the November 2008 Presidential Elections

The UConn VoTeR Center performed a pre-election audit of the memory cards for the Accu-Vote Optical Scan tabulators that are to be used in the November 2008 Elections in Connecticut. The cards are programmed by LHS Associates of Methuen, Massachusetts, and shipped to Connecticut districts for use in the elections. For the pre-election audit the VoTeR Center received and examined 620 memory cards as of November 3, 2008. These cards correspond to 620 distinct districts in Connecticut. About 2/3 of these memory cards were randomly chosen by the VoTeR Center personnel during the visits to LHS and before the cards were packed and shipped to the towns. Another 1/3 of the memory cards came from the towns directly, where the cards were randomly chosen for pre-election audit (this procedure applied to the town for which the cards were not selected at LHS). The towns that shipped the cards to be audited were not asked to perform the local pre-election testing before shipping, thus the majority of the cards received from the towns did not contain the pre-election testing events in their audit logs.

Read the rest of this entry »